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IATROD UCTIQN
Intrastate crises in which states perpetrate acts of atrocity against
their own people, or manifestly fail to protect their citizens from these
acts, pose difficult legal, political, and moral dilemmas for the global
community. I Since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's
("NATO") intervention in Kosovo, scholars of international law have
vigorously debated when, and by what criteria, a forceful intervention
not authorized by the United Nations Security Council ("UNSC") is
justified on humanitarian grounds. 2 In comparison, relatively little
attention has been paid to developing criteria to determine the
permissibility of intermediary humanitarian response mechanisms, or
nonforceful measures, preceding armed intervention. 3 The tern
"atrocity crime" encompasses the four gravest violations of
international law: (1) genocide, (2) war crimes, (3) crimes against
humanity, and (4) ethnic cleansing. 4 The use of intermediary
1. See, e.g., Presidential Study Directive on Creation of an Interagency Atrocities
Prevention Board and Corresponding Interagency Review, PSD-10, 2011 DAILY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 549 (Aug. 4, 2011) [hereinafter PSD-10] (announcing the creation of the Atrocities
Prevention Board); Press Release, Secretary-General Presents His Annual Report to General
Assembly, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7136, GA/9596 (Sept. 20, 1999) [hereinafter UN Press
Release] ("The inability of the international community in the case of Kosovo to reconcile
these two equally compelling interests universal legitimacy and effectiveness in defence of
human rights-can only be viewed as a tragedy."); Interview Madeleine Albright, FRONTLINE
PBS (Apr. 1. 2004). http://www.pbs.orgiwgbh/pages/fi'ontline/sliows/ghosts/interviews/
albright.html ("[I]t's all ftine for people to comment years later .. about what could have
happened. The timing and the resources and the approach of the international community just
could not make it happen... I wish I had fought for it. But even if I had, nothing would have
happened.").
2. See, e.g., Julie Mertus, Reconsidering the Legality of Humanitarian Intervention:
Lessons from Kosovo, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1743, 1750-51 (2000) (arguing that the
United Nations ("'tN") Charter supports humanitarian intervention in response to "affirmative
human rights concerns"); Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for
Incremental Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL
DILEMMAS 232, 252 55 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003) (encouraging the
incremental development of an international norm rather than a deliberate construction of legal
guidelines).
3. See SARAH SEWALL ET AL., MASS ATROCITY RESPONSE OPERATIONS: A MILITARY
PLANNING HANDBOOK 5 (2010) ("The Mass Atrocity Response Operations (MARO) Project
seeks to enable the United States and the international community to stop genocide and mass
atrocity as part of a broader integrated strategy by explaining key relevant military concepts
and planning considerations."); see also Robert 1. Rotberg, Deterring Mass Atrocity Crimes:
The Cause of Our Era, in MAss ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTLUE OUTRAGES 1. 16-
21 (Robert 1. Rotberg ed., 2010) (emphasizing the need for early warning inormation as well
as military planning).
4. G.A. Res. 60/1, JI 138-40, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/1 (Oct. 24. 2005) (narrowing
applicability of Responsibility to Protect ("R2'P") doctrine to the tour most egregious crimes in
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mechanisms may deter or halt the commission of these crimes, but
they also likely constitute breaches of state sovereignty not rising to
the level of force under international law.f
This Note focuses on the legality of employing unmanned aerial
vehicles ("UAVs"), often referred to as "drones," to gather
information about the commission of atrocities in another state
without that state's consent.6 The relevance of UAVs to the collection
and dissemination of visual evidence of atrocity crimes is acute.' As
states reduce their citizens' free access to technology as a means of
retaining power, the resulting difficulty in receiving reliable data on
ongoing atrocities will likely increase the value of intermediary
mechanisms. UAVs may, therefore, constitute a legitimate
intermediary humanitarian interference mechanism, given their ability
to provide useful atrocity response services without recourse to force.
Because of this, greater attention should be paid to delineating the
legal limits surrounding the use of UAVs to deter atrocity crimes.
The modern system of global governance, with the United
Nations ("UN") at its pinnacle, is founded on the long-established
principle of state sovereignty.' Under the UN Charter, the UNSC is
international law); see Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 (111) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/260(111), art. 2 (Dec. 9, 1948) (defining the
crime of genocide); see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 5-8, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (limiting the court's jurisdiction to the
most egregious within the international system); Martha Minow, Naming Horror: Legal and
Political Wiords for Mass Atrocities, 2 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 37, 38 (2007)
(encouraging use of the term atrocity crimes" to refer to these four categories).
5. See Sarah E. Kreps, Social Netwiorks and Technolog in the Prevention of Crimnes
Against - uinanity, in MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTURE OUTRAGES, supra note
3, at 175, 175-77. 184-88 (exploring the use of technology and social media to deter crimes
against humanity); see also PSD-10, supra note 1, at I (stating that US government action
should include a range of options).
6. For a list of other terms used in reference to unmanned aerial vehicles ("UAVs"), see
ELIZABETH BONE & CHRISTOPHER BOLKCOM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31872,
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS I (2003).
7. See Rajan Menon, Pious Wiords, Puny Deeds: The "International Commnlnity" and
Mass Atrocities, 23 ETHICS & INT1 AFF. 235, 236-38 (2009) (calling for new methods of
atrocity prevention that focus more on protection of civilians); see also Andrew Stobo
Sniderman & Mark Hams, Op-Ed. Drones for Hunan Rights, N.Y. TIMELS, Jan. 30, 2012, at
A25 (arguing the merits of allowing drones to monitor for human rights abuses in Syria);
Micah Zenko, The Power of 1itres: imagery and .1ass Atrocities, COLNCIL ON FoREiGN
REL. BLOC (Mar. 29, 2012). http:/blogs.cfr.org/zenko/2012'03/29/the-power-of-witness-
imagery-and-mass-atrocities/ (exploring the power of imagery in torcing action to stop atrocity
crimes).
8. U.N. Charter art. 2. paras. 1, 3-4, 7 (listing the major founding principles of the
United Nations ("UN")).
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empowered to authorize military and nonforceful interventions into a
sovereign state. 9 Historically, however, the UNSC has rarely
authorized either type of intervention.10 States wishing to intervene to
protect civilians in another state without UNSC authorization face
difficult evidentiary and legal hurdles in claiming humanitarian
justifications."
The criteria presented in Part II and analyzed in Part III are
intended to assist in determining the permissibility of states
unilaterally using UAVs to monitor mass atrocities perpetrated within
the borders of a nonconsenting state. For the purposes of this Note,
"intervention" will be used to refer to forceful action, whereas
"interference" will denote nonforceful actions. This Note concludes
that sending UAVs into the sovereign airspace of a state, without the
intruded-upon state's permission. does not constitute an illegal action
under international law if the action meets the following criteria: (1)
the humanitarian situation within the monitored state is so severe as to
warrant action in advance of, or without, formal UNSC approval; (2)
there is a reliable basis for believing that the monitored state is
committing, or is manifestly failing to protect civilians against,
atrocities; (3) the monitoring state has a reasonable expectation that
sending UAVs to monitor will result in the collection of useful
infornation potentially demonstrative as to the monitored state's
complicity in the alleged atrocities; and (4) there are limits on the type
and use of the information collected and upon whom may carry out
these monitoring missions.
9. Id. arts. 39, 41-42 (authorizing the UN Security Council ("UNSC") to intervene on
the basis of "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression").
10. See Matthew Jamison, Humanitarian Inervention Since 1990 and liberal
Interventionism,' in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: A HISTORY 365, 365-71 (Brendan
Simms & D.J.B. Trim eds., 2011) (providing a brief overv-iew of the effects of the end of the
Cold War on UNSC politics and humanitarian interventions). See generally Michael J.
Glennon, Why the Security Council Failed, 82 FoREIGN AF. 16 (2003) (describing the politics
of UNSC decisionmaking).
11. See S.C. Res. 1244. U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (June 10, 1999) (providing ex post facto
approval of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's ("NATO") air campaign in Kosovo and
eliminating the need for NATO to address the legality of its actions); INT'L COMMN ON
INTERVENTION & STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1.7 (2001)
[hereinafter RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT] (stating one of the goals of R2P is to build a greater
understanding of the issues in overcoming the legal hurdles posed by state sovereignty in the
context of atrocity response operations); see also Stromseth, supra note 2. at 248-51 (setting
out a series of elements in support of a global norm of intervention that fits within the existing
framework of international law).
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In proposing unilateral use of UAVs as an intermediary
humanitarian interference option, this Note will proceed in three
Parts. Part I outlines essential points of international humanitarian law
applicable to the proposal and describes UAVs and the grounds for
their increasing use by the United States. Part II examines the
evolution and transition over time of the concept of state sovereignty.
Part III proposes that, within set parameters, unilateral use of UAVs
to monitor mass atrocities is a logical extension of the Responsibility
to Protect ("R2P") doctrine.
I. MSS ATROCITY PREVENlION AND RESPONSE ACIONS IN
IN TERAA 7 JONAL LA W
Part I proceeds in two parts. Section A provides background
information about UAVs, their use, and important operational
considerations. Section B describes key principles of international
humanitarian law and the evolution of R2P. Together, these Sections
provide the technical and legal background necessary for exploration
of the current debate on humanitarian intervention contained in Part
II.
A. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. Use, Operational Considerations, and
ProliJeration
US government use of UAVs has grown since the late 1990s as
developments in technology have improved UAV efficiency and
situational adaptability. 12 The US Department of Defense ("DoD"), in
particular, has invested in developing UAV capabilities to meet a
wide array of situational needs." Currently, these capabilities include
12. See Jim Garamone, From US. Civil JTar to 4jghanistan: A Short History f bU4Vs,
AM. FORCES PRESS SER. U.S. DEPT DEF., Apr. 16, 2002, available at
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id 44164 (providing a brief history of UAV
technology in the US military)- see also James Dao & Steven Lee Myers, Afilitary Finds Short
Supplies of Spying Craft as ? eed Rises, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2001, at B I (describing improving
UAV technology and increasing military demand). See generally LAURENCE R. NEWCONE,
UNMANNED AVIATION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES (2004)
(explaining the history of UAVs and changes in UAV technology).
13. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Armed Servs., Senate Armed Services
Committee Completes Markup of National Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2001
(May 10, 2000), available at http://inied-services.senate.gov/pressiOlnark.pdf (showing
Senate support for Deparment of Defense UAV development); see also Joe Pappala'do, The
Future fi UA in the U.S. .4r Force, POPULAR MECHANICS (Feb. 26, 2010, 12:00 AM),
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remote navigation, advanced loitering abilities, varied surveillance
technology, and the unique durability of specific UAV models in
changing environmental and combat conditions.14 The US military's
growing arsenal of UAVs ranges in size from the small hand-
launched Raven to the large Global Hawk."
UAVs are referred to as unmanned, but the term "remotely
manned" is more accurate. 16 Remote pilots operate UAVs and are
often located thousands of miles away from the UAV's actual
location. 17 For example, pilots at Nellis Air Force Base near Las
Vegas operate Predator drones in Afghanistan and Iraq through
satellite communications links. 1" Remote piloting is particularly
http: /wwv.popularmechanics.com/techinology/aviation/militarx/4347306 (discussing drones
in the Air Force).
14. See The Drones of R-ar, 15 STRATEGIC COMMENTS, no. 4, June 2009, at 1 2
(discussing the benefits of using UAVs in place of traditional technology); see also
CHRISTOPHER BOLKOM, CONG. RESE RCH SERV., RS21698, HOMLAND SECURITY:
UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER SURVEILLANCE 3 (2005) (describing advantages
of UAV techmology, including cameras, which "can identify an object the size of a milk carton
from an altitude of 60,000 feet').
15. See Kimberly Johnson, Army Finds Raven U.4Ils Unsuitable Jor Baghdad Use,
AVIATION WEEK, Sept. 6, 2005, http://www.aviationweek.com/awigenericstorygeneric. jsp?
channel aerospacedaily&id-nevws/RAVE09065.xlml&headlie Aim5%2OFinds o2ORaven0%
20UAVs%/o20Unsuitable%20 Fotor20OBaghdad/o2OUse (describing the Raven); see also
Predator RQ-]/.Q I/M1Q-9 Reaper United States of America, AIRFORCE-TECHNOLOY.COM,
http://www.airforce-technology.com/Projects/predator-uav/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2012)
(providing an overview of the specifications of the Predator UAV, which is larger than the
Raven and smaller than the Global Hawvk); Factsheet: RQ-4 Global Hawk-, U.S. AIR FORCE
(Jan. 27, 2012). http:/www.afmil'inforinatioi/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id 13225 (explaining
the capabilities ofthe Global Hawk).
16. See BONE & BOLKCOM, supra note 6, at I (defining UAVs alternatively as "remotely
piloted vehicles"); Justin M. Boling, Face of Defense: Unmanned Aerial ["ehicle Operator
Guides Peers, Am. FORCES PRESS SERV. U.S. DEP T DEF., Sept. 21, 2011, available at
http://www.defense.govnliews/iiewsarticle.aspx?id 65403 (explaining how remote piloting
works).
17. See, e.g., Marc Pitzke, How; Drone Pilots ifage lf-ar, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Mar. 12,
2010, http:/vwww.spiegel.de/intemational/ world O.1518,682420,00.html (depicting CIA drone
pilots operating from command center over 6800 miles away from target): see also BONE &
BOLKCOM, supra note 6, at 3 (describing this distance as a benefit).
18. See David A. Fulghum, Rapid Expansion of UA V Units Planned, AVIATION WEEK,
Sept. 25. 2005, http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/genericistory generic.jsp?channel
awst&id=news/09265p0 l.xml&headline= Rapid%20OExpainsion% 20ot/ 20UAV% 20Units%20
Planned (explaining the central hub established for UAV piloting and data collection), see also
Noah Shachtman, Attck of the Drones, WIRED, June 2005, http:/,iwww.wired.cor/wiredi
archive/13.06/drones.htirl (explaining how remote piloting works).
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advantageous because UAV pilots cannot be injured or captured by
enemy forces in the course of their duties."
UAVs also offer a range of particularly valuable surveillance
and monitoring technologies that may be directly applicable to
atrocity response operations. Unlike satellites or planes, UAVs can
remain over a specific location for an extended period of time.2' This
"loitering" capability is particularly beneficial, because it increases
the amount of data collected from a predefined surveillance area.21
While loitering, UAVs may take video or still photos in visual,
infrared, or radar imagery, and transmit -live" footage of a scene to
decisionmakers. '2 Additionally, unlike satellites, which orbit
anywhere from 180 to more than 42,000 kilometers above Earth,
UAVs fly much closer to Earth's surface. This decreases the cost of
loitering as well as the cost of transmitting data to analysts on the
ground.23
The use of military resources, like UAVs, for humanitarian
purposes is not without precedent. 24 The adoption of
counterinsurgency strategy by US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, in
particular. has encouraged acceptance of unconventional, civilian-
19. See Shachtman, supra note 18 (explaining the advantages of remote piloting); see
also Pitzke, supra note 17 (describing the safety of the drone pilot).
20. See BOLKOM, spra note 14, at 2-4 (explaining the general capabilities and benefits
of UAV technology); see also The Drones pf Tiar, supra note 14, at 1 2 (discussing use of
UAVs for surveillance and armed combat).
21. See NEWCOMEW, supra note 12, at 101-16 (explaining specialized surveillance
capabilities of UAVs); see also CHAD C. HADDAL & JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21698, HOMELAND SECURITY: UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLES AND BORDER
SURVEILLANCE 3 (2010) ("The ability of UAVs to loiter for prolonged periods of time has
important operational advantages over manned aircraft.").
22. See P. W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of LJar, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter
2009, at 25, 37-39, http://www.thenewatlantis.conr/publications/military-robots-and-the-laws-
of-war (describing UAV surveillance techniques).
23. See Predator UA!. ABC NEWS, Jan. 7, 2006, http:i/abcnews.go.com/'USiSto id=
92357&page 1 (explaining that the Predator UAV can loiter for up to forty hou's and has a
"4maximum ceiling of 25,000 feet"); see also Suspended Animation: Unmanned Craft Loitering
in the Stratosphere May Soon Supplant Satellites, ECONOMIST, July 5, 2003. at 70 (explaining
that UAVs are closer to the ground than satellites, so their transmitters and receivers can be
less powerful and more cost effective); Holli Riebeek, Catalog of Earth Satellite Orbits,
NASA-EARTH OBSERVATORY (Sept. 4, 2009). http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/
OrbitsCatalog/(noting the distance from Earth at which satellites orbit).
24. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., JP 3-07.6, JOINT TACTICS,
TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES FOR FOREIGN HLMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE, at vii (2001)
(outlining official US Department of Defense ("DoD") tactics in using military resources to
provide humanitarian assistance).
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focused operations. The DoD's Mass Atrocity Prevention and
Response Options ("MAPRO") program is an attempt to write plans
for potential military responses to future international humanitarian
crises. 6 MAPRO is particularly focused on developing effective plans
for responding to the commission of atrocities, meaning "widespread
and systematic use of violence by state or nonstate armed groups
against noncombatants. ' ' 27 Nontraditional forms of information are
critical to MAPRO actions, including influencing public opinion to
support greater action to stop or deter atrocities.
B. International Law andAtrocit
, 
Crimes
International law encompasses the binding rules governing
relations between sovereign states. 29 The UN Charter is at the heart of
our modern international law regime and contains the guiding
principles governing relations between UN member states) Other
sources of modern international law include, in descending degree of
authority: treaties and international conventions; customary
international law ("CIL"); jus cogens, or the "general principles of
law recognized by civilized nations;" and the opinions of highly
25. See U.S. ARMY, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, COUNTERINSURGENCY, at 2 I (2006)
(explaining the importance of integrating military and civil efforts and framing response
civilian needs as an essential aspect of military strategy); see also Athanasia G. Austin,
Development of US Iregular Lf-aifare (aT)abilities, J. JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CTR.,
no. 6, 2007, at 1, available at http://wvw-w.japcc.de/fileadmii/user upload/journal/Ed 6/
070717 Austin Article - US lrregular Warfare.pdf (arguing that the US Air Force should
develop permanent irregular warfare policies to better address the realities of the US military
missions today).
26. See generally SEWALL ET AL., supra note 3 (providing the basis for current DoD
Mass Atrocity Prevention and Response Options program ("MAPRO") efforts).
27. Id. at 17.
28. See id. at 43 (explaining that nontraditional sources of information are critical to
MAPRO); see also Alan J. Kuperman, Mass Atrocity Reyl)onse Operations: Doctrine in
Search ofStrategy, 6 GENOCIDE STUD. & PREVENTION 59, 60-65 (2011) (critiquing attempts
to enshrine MVAPRO principles within military doctrine).
29. See Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 1 (1995)
("International law is the law of the international system of nation states."); see also Yuen-Li
Liang, United -Nations: Documents on the Development and Codification of International Law,
41 Am. J. INTl L. SUPP. 29, 32 35 (1947) (describing the advent of international law and its
primary purpose of regulating relations between states).
30. See U.N. Charter art. 2 (outlining the guiding principles of the UN); see also
HENKIN, supra note 29, at 14 15 (discussing the role of the UN in the international system).
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qualified national jurists. 31 Determining the legality of using UAVs to
unilaterally monitor atrocity crimes, therefore, must begin with an
exploration of these foundational principles and their continued
applicability in the midst of the commission of atrocity crimes.
1. General Principles of Public International Law: Prohibition on the
Use or Threat of Force and the Principle of Nonintervention
Article 2(4) of the UN Charter enumerates the general
prohibition on intervention. 2 The Article prohibits the "threat or use
of force" by UN member states against another state. 3 The Charter,
however, recognizes two exceptions to this prohibition: states may
use force if they are acting in self-defense and states may take
forceful action if the UNSC authorizes that action in question. 34
"Use of force" is not explicitly defined in any international
instrument. Under the prevailing view, however, "force" is limited to
armed force. 35 Economic and other types of coercion are considered
separate from armed force under the general principle of
nonintervention. 36 The UN General Assembly's Declaration on
Friendly Relations ("Declaration") supports this interpretation of
31. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
33 U.N.T.S 993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute] (listing these sources as the definitive statement of
the sources of international law).
32. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (providing the general prohibition against using force against
the "territorial integrity or political independence of any state"). But see Brunno Simma,
AATO, the UA1 and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EuR. J. INTl L. I, I 5 (1999)
(arguing that states have an obligation to respect and protect the basic human rights of all
individuals and that where a state is in violation, the other may "lawfilly consider itself legally
'injured' and is thus entitled to resort to countermeasures").
33. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
34. Id. arts. 38-42, 51 (outlining the circumstances and providing the authority by which
the UN or its member states may intervene); see Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.). 1986 I.C.J. 14, ' 176, 249 (June 27) (exploring the
parameters of "use of force" within international law).
35. U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (lacking explicit definition of "force"); see Albrecht
Randelzhofer, Article 2(4), in TH CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 106,
108 18 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that Article 2(4) prohibits all uses of aimed
force not specifically approved under the UN Charter): see also Timothy Kearley, Regulation
of Preventive and Preemptive Force in the United -Nations Charter: A Search for Original
Intent, 3 WYO. L. REV. 663, 670 (2003) (providing various views on the definition of "force"
in the UN Charter).
36. See Randelzhofer, supra note 35, at 112 n.25 ("The term does not cover any possible
kind of force, but is, according to the correct and prevailing view, limited to armed force."):
see also Matthew C. Waxman, Cyber-Attacks and the Use of Force: Back to the Future of
Article 2(4). 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 421, 427-30 (2011) (outlining the development of "use of
force" under Article 2(4), as it pertains to new technologies).
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"force" as denoting military coercion. 7 The Declaration has long
been held to be a persuasive source of international law regarding the
relations between states and the legitimate use of force. 8
A general prohibition against intervention by one state in another
state's domestic affairs is a historic fixture of CIL.39 Article 2(7) of
the UN Charter reaffirms this prohibition, by proscribing intervention
by the UN and its member states in issues within a state's "domestic
jurisdiction." 40 The legal and theoretical basis for Article 2(7) is
rooted in the equality of all UN members in their sovereignty. 4'
Article 2(7) provides an exception by empowering the UNSC to
approve a domestic intervention if it determines that a threat of
aggression or danger to peace may exist. 42
37. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625(XXV) (Oct. 24, 1970); see also
Randelzhofer, supra note 35, at 112 ("When interpreting the Principle that states shall refrain
in their international relations from the threat or use of force, the Declaration deals solely with
military force.").
38. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), supra note 37 (reaffirming the "importance of the [UN
Charter] in the promotion of rule of law among nations"); see also Robert Rosenstock, The
Declaration on Principles of international Lau; Concerning Friendly Relations: .4 Survey, 65
AM. J. INTL L. 713, 715 16 (1971) (proposing that the purpose of the Declaration was "to
clarify the standards and thereby to make more accurate the evaluation by states of how far
they can go without provoking a reaction arising out of another state's view of what is
acceptable").
39. ICJ Statute, supra note 31, art. 38(1) (listing customary international law ("CIL") as
one of the tour sources of international law); see Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, at 34
(reaffirming the prohibition as CIL); see also JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LoUISE
DoSWALD-BECK, 1 CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, at xiviii (2009)
(accepting the prohibition as CIL); Albert Bleckmann, Article 2(l), in 'THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITEDNATIONS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 35, at 77, 80 ("The principle of sovereignty is
not a rule of public international law wIhich could be directly applied to factual situations. It is
rather a 'principle' from which certain legal rules of customary international law, such as state
iimunity or the prohibition of intervention have evolved in the context of competing
principles."1).
40. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 ("Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter ....").
41. Id. art. 2(1); see Felix Ermacora, Article 2(7), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED
NATIONS: A COMIMENTARY, supra note 35, at 139, 143 ("[Respect for matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a state has as its legal basis the respect for the
sovereign equality of all members (Art 2(1)).").
42. U.N. Charter rts. 2 paras. 7, 39-42 (outlining the circumstances under wvhich and the
means by which the UNSC may take collective action against a member state).
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2. Classification of Conflicts: Noninternational Armed Conflicts in a
Legal Regime Intended to Regulate International Armed Conflicts
The law of armed conflict ("LOAC") refers to the body of public
international law that governs a state's decision to go to war (jus ad
bellum) and the conduct of belligerents once a conflict has
commenced (jus in bello).13 In making the decision to go to war,
states and their leaders premise their reasoning upon various
philosophical and ethical frameworks.44 "Just war" theory is one such
doctrine on military ethics and the ethical use of force. 45 At its core,
just war theory seeks to impose ethical rules upon both the decision to
go to war and the conduct of hostilities once they begin. 4' This theory
is particularly relevant to current US policy discussions surrounding
the use of force. 47 Jus ad bellum principles govern the circumstances
under which a state may resort to force, and by analogy may also
provide persuasive guidance as to when a state may violate another
43. See KEIICHIRO OKIMOTO, THE DISTINCTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JA.5 A])
BK'LLUA AND JuI\ Bh/LO 7 12 (2011) (explaining the remaining distinctions betweenjus ad
bellurn and jus in hello); Carsten Stahn, 'Jus ad Bellum, ' 'Jus in Bello'. . . 'Jus post Belun'?
Rethinking the Conception qf the Law ofArmed Force, 17 EUR. J. INT1 L. 921, 9212 4 (2007)
(theorizing different applications of the law of armed conflict ("LOAC") at various phases of a
conflict).
44. See, e.g., CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR (Anatol Rapoport ed., Penguin Books
1968) (1873) (representing an influential view of the nature of warfare and motivations for
engaging in it): Si NT AUGLSTINE, Tim CITY OF GOD bk. XIX, at 515, 517-18. in 18 THE
CONFESSIONS: THE CITY OF GOD, ON CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE 165 (Marcus Dods trans., Robert
Maynard Hutchins, ed., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc. 1989) (examining free choice, warfare,
and related theological issues).
45. See John Langan, Fhe Elements ofSt. Augustine's Just R-ar Theo y, 12 J. RELIGIOUS
ETHICS 19, 25 37 (1984) (explaining the basics of just war theory from a Catholic
perspective); see also Ross Douthat, Just H'ar and Modern Wartare, ATLANTIC (Jan. 5. 2009.
11:58 AM), http://ww-,N.theattantic.com/personaI/archive/2009/O/just-war-and-modern-
warfare/55891/ (analyzing the application ofjust war theory to a recent conflict).
46. See Langan, supra note 45, at 24-27 (examining underlying themes of St.
Augustine's just war theory); see also 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA OF
SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 11-11.40. 1, at 578 79 (Robert Maynard Hutchins ed., Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1989 ed.) (examining the
conditions whereby a war may be found just).
47. See Michael Walzer, The Triumph ofJust War Theory-and the Dangers of Success,
69 Soc. RESEARCH 4. 4-6 (2009) (discussing the United States's return to just war theory after
World War IT); see also Roger Wertheimer, Introduction: .4 Great Awakening, in
ENIPOWERING OUR MILITARY CONSCIENCE: TRANSFORMIING JUST WAR THEORY AND
MILITARY MORAL EDUCATION 1. 1-11 (Roger Wertheimer ed., 2010) (discussing the
development of ethics training within the aimed forces).
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state's territorial sovereignty for humanitarian purposes. 48
Historically, just war theory has asserted six criteria necessary to
determine if the use of force is appropriate: (1) just cause, (2) right
intention. (3) proper authority, (4) last resort, (5) probability of
success, and (6) proportionality .4 Just war theory and jus ad be/lur
criteria remain relevant because they provide a framework for
evaluating the permissibility of humanitarian interference
operations."'
Within the LOAC, there are two distinct types of armed
conflicts: international armed conflicts ("IAC") and noninternational
armed conflicts ("NIAC"). 1IACs occur between two or more
sovereign states and are governed by the entire corpus of the LOAC,
including all the Geneva Conventions. 52 NIACs, on the other hand,
take place within the borders of a single state and likely involve
48. See Sean D. Murphy, Protean Jus Ad Bellun, 27 BERKELEY J. INTL L. 22, 22 26
(2009) (analyzingjus ad bellun in a changing international law context); see also Stahn, supra
note 43, at 924 26 (noting the possibility of "a new normative dispensation, according to
which egregious violations ofjus in hello [such as the commission of atrocity crimes] could be
regarded as the trigger for rights under thejus ad bellurn").
49. See Eric A. Heinze & Brent J. Steele, Introduction: Non-State Actors and the Just
War Tradition, in ETHiCs, AUTHORITY, AND WAR: NON-STATE ACTORS AND THE JUST WAR
TR.ADITION 1, 5-6 (Eric A. Heinze & Brent J. Steele eds., 2009) (listing the just war criteria:
just cause, right authority, right intention, proportionality of ends, last resort, and reasonable
prospect for success).
50. See Walzer, supra note 47, at 934-36 (explaining the continued applicability of just
war theory in contemporary conflicts); see also Wertheimer, supra note 47, at 1I I
(discussing the continued demand for just war ethics education).
51. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (11I) art. 2(1),
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (providing the generally accepted definition of
an international armed conflict ("JAC") as "all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict wvhich may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if a state
of war is not recognized by one of them"); id art. 3 (defining a nonintemational armed conflict
("NIAC") as a "'aimed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of
one of the High Contracting Parties").
52. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (111), supra note
51, art. 2 (applying to "all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may
arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not
recognized by one of thein" (emphasis added)); see Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Nov. 26-30,
2007, 30th International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent. International
Huinanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts, 301C/07/8.4, at 4-8
(2007), available at http: ,Nww.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/ihl-challenges-3Oth-
intemational-conference-eng.pdf ("A fi'agmentar5 approach to I-IL contradicts the essential
I1L principle of humanity, wvhich must apply equally to all victims of armed conflict if it is to
retain its inherent meaning at all.").
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nonstate actors. Article 3 common to all four Geneva Conventions
of 1949 ("Common Article 3") and Additional Protocol 11 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions are the only portions of the LOAC that explicitly
govern NIACs. 54
The distinction between IACs and NIACs relates to the
permissibility of unilateral atrocity monitoring in two ways. First, the
existence of an NIAC may indicate that an internal disturbance has
risen to a level justifying unilateral monitoring. Second, because
different aspects of the LOAC apply in IACs and NIACs, determining
the permissibility of a monitoring state's actions may differ in these
two contexts. Recent history also suggests that NIACs are now more
prevalent than IACs. 56
The presence of an "armed conflict" distinguishes NIACs from
other situations of internal disturbances or internal tensions. 57 In the
1997 case Prosecutor v. Tadic, the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia outlined a two-prong test for determining the
existence of an armed conflict: (a) the intensity of the conflict and (b)
the organization of the parties. 58 Under the first prong in Tadic, an
armed conflict only exists when a situation rises to a level of violence
that is not a normal or routine extension of tense internal discourse, or
53. See Sylvain Vite, Ipology of'Arnted Cotifficts in International Humanitarian Lau:
Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 69, 70-75 (2009) (describing
the characteristics of a typical conflict in an NIAC context).
54. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time
of War (IV) ait. 3. Aug. 12, 1949. 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Common
Article 3]; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1I), June
8. 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol 1I] (developing Common Article
3 and expanding the range of conflicts brought under its jurisdiction).
55. See ANTHONY CULLEN, THE CONCEPT OF NON-IN TERNAT IONAL ARMED CONFLICT
PN INTERNATIONAL HLTMANITARIAN LAW 8-23 (2010) (examining the traditional
determination as to what aspects of international law applied in a given conflict). See genealal/y
Franqois Bugnion, Jus ad Bellun, Jus in Bello and Von-International Armed Conflicts, in 6
YEARBOOK OF INT'L HLTNLMNITARIAN LAW 167 (2003) (examining the distinction betweenjus
ad bellum andjus in hello in the context of ai NIAC).
56. See Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., Armed Conflict 1946 2001: A -New Dataset, 39 J.
PEACE RES. 615, 616 (2002) (discussing the increasing number of NIACs as compared to
IACs).
57. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1. Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, J 94 (lnt'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995) (discussing the factors relevant to determining the existence of an "international" armed
conflict).
58. Id.  562 (providing a formula for determining the characterization of an armed
conflict).
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a momentary civil disturbance. 59 The second prong in Tadic requires
that the groups involved meet a minimum level of organization.60
These two components are evaluated on a case-by-case basis utilizing
indicative factors like the intensity of the particular conflict.61
3. Evolution of the Principle of Nonintervention
The prevailing understanding of Article 2(7), addressing a
general prohibition against intervention, has changed over time.i
Early scholars of the UN Charter described Article 2(7) as regulating
the WN's relations with member states, not as embodying the general
principle of nonintervention among member states.63 The legality of
humanitarian interventions was previously thought to rest on general
international law or on the customary principle of nonintervention. 4
59. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Limaj, Case No. 1T-03-66-T, Judgment, 84, 90 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 2005) (using the Tadic test to determine whether an
armed conflict existed); Sylvain Vit6, supra note 53, at 69, 77 (explaining that internal
disturbances "cover less violent circumstances involving, for example, mass
arrests.... torture .. forced disappearance and/or the suspension of fundamental judicial
guarantees"); see also Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term "Armed Conflict"
Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, at 3-5 (Mar. 2008) (providing the ICRC's view
of how "arrmed conflict" should be interpreted under the LOAC). See generally Pascale
Chifflet, The First Trial of Former Members of the ,Kosovo Liberation Army: Prosecutor v.
Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu, 19 LEIDEN J. INTL L. 459, 459 65 (2006)
(examining the contribution Limaj made to the definition of armed conflict in international
jurisprudence).
60. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, 1 66-70; see Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T. 190; see also
Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T. Judgement, 60 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008) (providing a comprehensive review of the factors taken into
account by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in its armed conflict
determination).
61. Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-T, Judgement and Sentence, 93
(Dec. 6. 1999) (iT]he definition of an armed conflict per se is termed in the abstract, and
whether or not a situation can be described as an 'armed conflict,' meeting the criteria of
Common Article 3, is to be decided upon a case-by-case basis."); see Haradinaj, Case No. F1-
04-84-T. ' 49 (-Trial Chambers have relied on indicative factors relevant for assessing the
'intensity' criterion .... ").
62. See, e.g., Ermacora, supra note 41, 2 6-27, at 149 (arguing that Article 2(7)
contains three specific rules governing the UN's relationship with member states); cf LS.
Watson, Autointerpretatation, Competence, and the Cortiruing alidity of Article 2(7) of the
U<N Charter, 71 Am. J. INT'L L. 60, 60, 66 (1977) (providing an example of an older
understanding of Article 2(7)).
63. See, e.g., Ermacora, supra note 41, J129, at 150 ("The rule of Art. 2(7) is merely a
detail of the general rule of non-interx-ention .. a delimitation of competence between the
state and the organs of the UN.").
64. See id. ' 31, at 150-51 (stating that the legality of hulanitafian interventions
undertaken by member states is judged under general international law, not Article 2(7)), see
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In the mid-to-late 1990s, however, this perception changed; the end of
the Cold War shifted attention to effective responses to humanitarian
crises. 65
For the purposes of this Note, humanitarian intervention is
defined as:
[T]he threat or use ol force across state borders by a state (or
group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and
grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals
other than [the acting state's] own citizens, without the
permission of the state within whose territory force is applied. 66
This definition encompasses the generally understood definition of
humanitarian intervention and provides a starting point from which to
explore changing state practice regarding the protection of civilians.67
A state's decision whether or not to employ an intermediary
humanitarian interference option against another state can be likened
to one state's decision to use force against another. 68 In both
situations, the intervening state must justify its breach of another
state's inherent sovereignty.69 Without a justification of its actions,
the intervening state is vulnerable to charges of violation of the
also MICHAEL NEWMAN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: CONFRONTING THE
CONTRADICTIONS 8-11 (2009) (arguing that after World War 11 the state was the central
element of the international order).
65. See NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 38 39 (explaining the effect of the end of the Cold
War on the development of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention); JANE STROMSETH ET
AL., CAN MIGHT MAKE RIGHTS? BUILDING THE RULE OF LAW AFTER MILITARY
INTERVENTIONS 3 4 (2006) (exploring the responsibilities of acting states following ain
intervention and their potential humanitarian responsibilities).
66. J.L. Holzgrefe, [he Humanitarian Intervention Debate, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS, sUpra note 2, at 15, 18
(emphasis added).
67. See NEWMAN, supra note 64, at 3 (describing the varied terminology used in
reference to humanitarian actions); see also Bernard Kouchner, The Right to Intervention
Codified in Kosovo, 16 NEW PERSPECTIVES Q., Summer 1999, at 4, 4 (providing an older
conception of humanitarian intrverntion as a "right").
68. See U.N. Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change,
A Mlore Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, 1 199-203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2.
2004) (demonstrating the trajectory towards acceptance of humanitarian intervention to protect
human rights); see also L. C. Green, Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law and
Threats to -National Security, 8 J. CONTLICT & SEC. L. 101. 113-15 (2003) (discussing the
issues raised by humanitarian intervention regarding the acted-upon state's sovereignty).
69. U.N. Charter, art. 2. paras. 4. 7; see RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11,
IT 4.18-4.27 (explaining that a state is required to justify its actions and provide reasonable
evidence of its hunanitarian purpose prior to any R2P intervention).
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prohibition against use of force enshrined in Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter.70
4. International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Civilians
Ethical imperatives have shaped the development of the LOAC
and, consequently, have influenced the development of humanitarian
norms in customary international law.7 In turn, as developments in
modem weaponry have raised ethical and moral concerns they have
also influenced the formation of LOAC norms. 72 The Saint Petersburg
Convention of 1868, which banned the use of certain projectiles, is an
example of this strong ethical influence on the LOAC in light of the
increasingly brutal human costs of modern warfare.73
In the 1949 Coifli Channel case, the International Court of
Justice ("ICJ") ruled that certain "elementary considerations of
huinanity" embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907 were part of
customary international law and applied even during peacetime.74 In
that case, the ICJ held that Albania had a legal obligation to warn an
70. See, e.g., Simma, supra note 32, at 15 21 (showing that even where a state claims
humanitarian justifications it is still vulnerable to charges of illegality) see also Jonathan E.
Davis, From Ideology to Pragmatism: China's Position on Humanitarian Intervention in the
Post-Cold War Era, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAVL L. 217, 254-64 (2011) (examining China's
position on R2P and humanitarian response operations from 2005 onward).
71. Hague Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
pmbl., July 29, 1899. 32 Star. 1803; see BRIAN D. LEPARD, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW: A NEW THEORY WITH PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS 145-47 (2010) ('[The] evolution of
international humanitarian law was largely inspired by perceived ethical imperatives.").
72. See Jakob Kellenberger, President, lnt'l Comm. of the Red Cross, Keynote Address
at the 34th Round Table on Current Issues of International Humanitarian Law, International
Humanitarian Law and New Weapon Technologies (Aug. 9, 2011) (laying out principles used
by the International Committee of the Red Cross to inform the approach of LOAC towards
new means and methods of warfare); see also ELIZABETH G. FERRIS, THi POLITICS OF
PROTECTION: THE LNITS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION 2 (2011) (arguing that developments in
humanitarian law were often a result of changes in warfare).
73. Saint Petersburg Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Certain
Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. I , 1868, 138 Consol. T.S. 297,
available at http://www.icrc.org/LOAC.nsf/FULL/1 3 0?OpenDocument [hereinafter Saint
Petersburg Declaration]: see Bonnie Docherty. Breaking \ew Ground: The Convention on
Cluster Aunitions and the Evolution qf International Humanitarian Law, 31 Hum. RTS. Q.
934, 935-40 (2009) (examining a more recent attempt to ban new weaponry based).
74. Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.). 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr. 9) (basing its decision on
"elementary considerations of humanity," which it held to be "even more exacting in peace
than in war"); see LEPARD, supra note 71, at 146 (noting that Corfu Channel implies that
"elementary considerations of humanity" may be a basis for recognizing a customary legal
obligation)
1138 FORDHAMIJNTERK\'%4TIONAL LAWJOUi \'4L [Vol. 35:1121
approaching British warship of minefields in its territorial waters.7
Additionally, the court explained that norms that had previously
applied only in wartime, also applied in peacetime because of their
status as customary international law. 76 This decision laid the
groundwork for later cases that expanded the applicability of LOAC
norms to nontraditional, nonarlned conflict contexts.77
LOAC treaties have increasingly paid heed to the importance of
civilian protection." Some of these protective norms have also found
their way into customary international law .79 For example, in Militarv
and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua ("Nicaragua"),
the ICJ found that Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions was equally applicable during both NIACs and IACs. °
The ICJ's holding appeared to declare that Common Article 3 could
be considered at the level of customary international law."l
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons ("Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion"), an ICJ advisory opinion of 1996, built
upon the foundation laid by the Saint Petersburg Declaration of 1868
and Article 36 of the Additional Protocol I of 1977, encompassing the
customary prohibition on the use of certain weapons included in those
documents.8 2 The Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion declared that
75. Cofu Channel, 1949 I.C.J. at 23.
76. Id at 22.
77. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.).
1986 I.C.J. 14, 214 (June 27) (finding that laying mines in a harbor infringed freedom of
communications and maritime commerce): Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1, Decision
on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995) (providing most thorough analysis to-date for determining
the existence of an armed conflict under international law).
78. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Iumanitarian Law, 94 AM,. J. INT'L L.
239, 250-65 (2000) (examining the increasing focus of the LOAC on the protection of
civilians): FERRIS, supra note 72, at 2-6 (discussing the term "protection" from a humanitarian
aid perspective).
79. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 218 (stating that Common Article 3 constitutes a
minimum level of rights applicable in armed conflicts and equating Common Article 3 with
CIL); see also LEPARD, supra note 71. at 146-47 ("Effectively, the Court concluded that these
rules had passed into customary international law in part because of their fundamental
humanitarian character.").
80. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. jj 218 ("[T]hese rules also constitute a minimum yardstick, in
addition to the more elaborate rules which are also to apply to international conflicts.").
81. See LEPARD, supra note 71, at 148: see also IENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra
note 39, at 3-14 (arguing that Common Article 3 must now be considered customary
international law).
82. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226 (July 8); see Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36,
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the basic rules of LOAC are to be "intransgressible principles of
international customary law."' 3 The ICJ held several fundamental
principles of the LOAC to be applicable in a nonconflict setting. 4
One of these, the principle of distinction, distinguishes combatants
from noncombatants by prohibiting the use of weapons incapable of
differentiating between military and civilian targets.8 1 Another bars
the use of weapons that caused needless suffering in order to protect
combatants from undue misery. 86 The 1CJ, drawing on the
overarching value of humanity, concluded that LOAC rules apply
continuously regardless of technological advances in weaponry,87
Corfu Channel, Nicaragua, and the Nuclear Weapons Advisory
Opinion together demonstrate that the humanitarian aspects of the
LOAC are, indeed, international law.8 These cases also exemplify the
role of ethical reasoning in the ICJ decisionmaking process.89 Respect
June 8. 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (describing obligation of a contracting party to ensure that
employment of a new weapon or technology would not violate international law); Saint
Petersburg Declaration, supra note 73 (exemplifying the prohibition of weaponry based on
humanitarian justifications).
83. Legality ofthe Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 82, 79 (asserting that
the basic rules of the LOAC "are so fundamental to the respect of the human person and
Ielementary considerations of humanity.. that these rules now "constitute intransgressible
principles of international customary law").
84. Id. ' 78 (listing "cardinal principles" of LOAC including: distinction, prohibition on
indiscriminate weapons, prohibition against unnecessary suffering, and restrictions on
weaponry); see Louise Doswald-Beck, International Humanitarian Law and the Advisofy
Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legaliy of the Threat or Use of Vuclear
Weapons, 316 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 35, 36-37 (1997) (providing an overview of the ICJ's
reasoning).
85. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 82, J178 (describing
the principle of distinction).
86. Id. (explaining the prohibition on unnecessary suffering).
87. Id. ' 86 (noting the "intrinsically humanitarian character of the [LOAC] legal
principles in question which permeates the entire law of armed conflict and applies to all forms
ofwarfare and to all kinds of weapons, those of the past, those ofthepresent and those qf the
future' (emphasis added)).
88. See supra notes 74, 80, 83-86 and accompany text (discussing these cases).
89. See GENTIAN ZYBERI, THE HUMANITARIAN FACE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE: ITS CONTRIBUTION TO INTERPRETING AND DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL
HIUMAN RIGHTS AND HUINAMTARIAN LAW RULES AND PRINCIPLES 257 (2008) (exploring the
ICJ's general willingness to apply humanitarian/moral principles to its decision-making
process): see also Vincent Chetail, The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to
international Humanitarian Law, 85 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 235, 235-36 36 11.2 (2003 )
(stating that rulings of the ICJ are the best formulation of international law on this topic).
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for these humanitarian principles helps states maintain and rebuild
civilized society during and after armed conflict.90
5. Evolution of UN Humanitarian Actions in Member States
The system of nation states that emerged from the 1648 Peace of
Westphalia recognized the internal sovereignty and external equality
of a community of states governed by commonly recognized rules of
coexistence." Under the Westphalian system of sovereign equality,
external interference in the internal affairs of another state was
prohibited, except in those matters implicating international
obligations.92 Even then, the international community discouraged the
forceful intervention of one state into the domestic affairs of another
offending state.9 3 In the political and legal discourse that emerged
during this period, a state's sovereignty was an essential
characteristic, not to be interfered with by external actors.94
During the twentieth century the attention of state leadership
turned increasingly from a focus on interactions between states to the
interactions of the state with its citizens.9 In part, the shift was due to
90. See Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, Factors in War to Peace Transitions, 27 HARV.
J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 843, 845-55 (2004) (exploring war-to-peace transitions and related LOAC
issues).
91. See 1ANS BLIX, SOVEREIGNTY, AGGRESSION AND NEUTRALITY 10-11 (1970)
(describing the post-World War 11 international system of governance as one between equally
sovereign states). But see Andreas Osiander, Sovereignty, International Relations, and the
Westphalian llyth, 55 INTL ORG. 251, 254 60 (2001) (claiming that "Westphalian"
sovereignty is a construction of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
92. See Daniel Philpott, Westphalia, Authority, and Inter national Society, 47 POL. STUD.
566, 57(-89 (1999) (providing background of the Westphalian system of statehood); see also
Brendan Simms, 'A False Principle in the Law of Nations': Burke, State Sovereignty.
[German] Liberty, and Intervention in the Age off tf estphalia, in HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: A HISTORY, supra note 10, at 89, 89 92 (examining state intervention in
early-modem Europe).
93. BLIX, supra note 91, at 12 ("[I]n matters which tall under the exclusive domestic
jurisdiction of a state, another state is not entitled to make any requests at all."); see D. F. B.
Trim & Brandon Simms, Towards a History of Huinanitarian Intervention, in HLT1LMNITARLAN
INTERVENTION: A HISTORY, supra note 10, at I, 21 (linking current support for humanitarian
intervention to older religious and moral support frameworks).
94. See Osiander, supra note 91, at 255-58 (providing argument against the largely
accepted discourse of Westphalian sovereignty); see also Trim & Simms, supra note 93, at 12
13 (discussing historical developments of state sovereignty).
95. Kofi Annmn, Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ditchley Foundation Lecture
XXXV (June 26, 1998), available at http://www.ditchley.co.uLpage/173ilecture-xxxv.htmn
("The fact that a conflict is 'internal' does not give the parties any right to disregard the most
basic rules of human conduct."). See generally Susan C. Breau, The Impact of the
Responsibility to Protect on Peacekeeping, II J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 429 (2007) (examining
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the adoption of the UN's Universal Declaration on Human Rights
("UDHR"), the subsequently increasing acceptance of human rights
norms as part of the larger canon of international law, and resulting
changes to elements of state and UN practice with regard to who were
considered "subjects" of international law." Prior to the adoption of
the UDHR, only states were considered to be subjects of international
law.97 With the advent of the UN and the international human rights
movement, the individual became a subject of international law. As a
consequence, the treatment of citizens by their government became an
integral component of relationships between states and a subject for
routine consideration by the UN."8
6. R2P and Humanitarian Intervention and Interference
A state's obligation to protect its own population from atrocity
crimes is widely accepted in the international community. 99 It was not
until relatively recently, however, that the international community
began to recognize the legitimacy of interventions by external states
to prevent these violations. 1" The following Sections explain the
intervention from the view of collective security and the impact of R2P on UN peacekeeping
operations).
96. See, e.g., Rosalyn Higgins, Conceptual Thinkirg About the Individual in
International Law, 4 BRIT. J. INT'L STUD. 1. 1-10 (1978) (developing concept of the
individual as a subject of international law); Rene Provost, Reciprocity in Human Rights and
Hunanitarian Law, 65 BRIT. Y.B. INT1 L. 383, 383 84 (1994) (examining the intersections of
human rights and humanitarian law).
97. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (111), prmbl., U.N. Doc.
AIRES/217 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating explicitly that individuals have rights under international
law): HINKIN, supra note 29, at 7-10 (explanation of the pre-UN system of statehood and its
antecedent, the European "princedoms").
98. See G.A. Res. 60/251, U.N. Doc. AIRES/60/251, at 2 (Apr. 3, 2006) (establishing the
Human Rights Council and affirming its reporting power): see also Rep. of the Human Rights
Council, 5th Sess., June 11 18, 2007, U.N. Doc No. A/62/53; GAOR, 62d Sess., Supp No. 53,
at 48 (2007) (establishing a new complaint procedure).
99. See EDWIN MONTEFIORE BORCHARD, THE DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS
ABROAD 296-97 (1915) (claiming that states have a right to protect their citizens); see also,
e.g., John R. D'Angelo, Note, Resort to Force by States to Protect Nationals: The U.S. Rescue
Mission to Iran and Its Legality Under International Law, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 485, 486-90
(198 1) (exploring legality of the US attempted rescue mission of its nationals held captive in
Iran).
100. See, e.g., World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programnre q' Action, ' 18, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 157/23 (July 12, 1993)
(recommending that the General Assembly establish the High Commissioner for Human
Rights); see NEWMIAN, supra note 64, at 46-49 (explaining the effects of the rise of
international human rights law on the humanitarian interention debate); see also
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relevance of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention and its
corollary, R2P, as they relate to the use of UAVs to unilaterally
monitor atrocity crimes. 10 1
States have claimed humanitarian grounds to justify intervening
in the affairs of another state as early as the nineteenth century. 102
More recently, following the 1999 NATO Kosovo operation and the
retroactive legitimacy granted to the mission by UNSC Resolution
1244, humanitarian justifications as the sole purpose for intervention
gained legitimacy.0 3 The doctrine of R2P developed in response to
the humanitarian intervention "dilemma" of the 1990s and subsequent
calls for a global consensus on the legality of humanitarian response
operations. 0 4
R2P shifts the debate from whether a state has a "right" to
intervene to a discussion of when a state has a "responsibility" to
intervene. 10' In 1999, then-UN Secretary General Kofi Annan
challenged the international community to develop a consensus on the
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11 . 2.6 (holding that states have a responsibility to
protect even nornationals from atrocity crimes).
101. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11, 1:0 1.31 (providing an
overview of the links between R2P and older conceptions of humanitarian intervention); see
also GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS ATROCITY CRIMES
ONCE AND FOR ALL 32 38 (2008) (describing the theories of humanitarian intervention that
directly contributed to the development of R2P).
102. See David Rodogno, The Principles of Humanity' and the European Powers'
Intervention in Ottoman Lebanon and Syria in 1860 1861, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:
A HISTORY, supra note 10, at 159, 15 961 (proposing that the European system of statehood
hindered unilateral interventions in Europe, but empowered European states to undertake such
actions elsewhere, thus encouraging the beginning of European colonialism) see also Jean-
Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrin of Hiuanitarian Intervention:
Its Current Validity Under the U. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INTL L.J. 203, 206-13 (1974)
(providing brief overview of historical perspective on humanitarian intervention, highlighting
importance of European powers' actions in Eastern Europe during the Cold War).
103. S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 1I, 5 (authorizing the NATO mission in Kosovo). But
see Louis Herlkin, Kosovo and the Law of "Humanitarian Intervention," 93 AM. J. INV L.
824, 825-30 (1999) (challenging the assertion that NATO's unilateral actions in Kosovo were
legal prior to UNSC authorization).
104. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I 1.1 1.9 (discussing the birth of
the R2P movement after the mass atrocities committed in Kosovo, Rwanda, and Somalia and
describing the demand at the time for a more flexible approach to humanitarian crises); see
EVANS, supra note 101, at 38-43 (describing the progression from formation of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty ("ICISS") to presentation of
the R2P Report to the international community).
105. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11, 1 2.28-2.33 (attempting to shift
discourse away from a "right" to intervene towards a "responsibility" to act in the face of mass
atrocity).
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authoritative foundation for humanitarian intervention." 6 Specifically,
he urged deliberation on the basic questions of "when," "by whom,"
and "how" armed intervention should be permitted." 7 In response, the
government of Canada sponsored the formation of the independent
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
("ICISS"). 10 In December 2001, ICISS published its report, The
Responsibility to Protect. 09 According to the report states cannot
exert unlimited power within their domestic jurisdiction."' Instead,
the report outlines a state's obligations to respect human rights and
LOAC obligations within their own borders, and to ensure the
protection of these principles abroad."' The report introduced a new
concept, "sovereignty as responsibility."''12
In its report, ICISS laid out six criteria for military intervention
that encompass general jus ad bellum principles and build on the just
war tradition. 13 These criteria are: (1) right authority, (2) just cause,
(3) right intention, (4) last resort, (5) proportional means, and (6)
reasonable prospects. 1 " The ICISS report detailed the meaning of
these criteria in relation to determining the necessary threshold for
legitimate military intervention for humanitarian purposes. 15
106. See UN Press Release, supra note 1 ("[The conflict in Kosovo] has cast in stark
relief the dilemma of what has been called humanitarian intervention ... ."); see also
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I 1, [ 1.6 (quoting former Secretary General Kofi
Annan, who asked: [I]f humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on
sovereignty, how should we respond to ... gross and systematic violations of human rights
that offend every precept of our common humanity?").
107. See generally UN Press Release, supra note 1 (calling on the international
community to act to stop atrocities as they take place).
108. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I, 4 11. -1.9 (explaining the origins
and goals of ICISS and its R2P Report).
109. See generally id (arguing that the principle of nonintervention must yield to the
"responsibility to protect" where a population is suffering serious harm and a state is unwilling
or unable to halt or avert the harm).
110. See id 2.28 2.33 (shifting the debate on humanitarian intervention from a "right
to intervene" towards acceptance of a "responsibility to protect").
111. See id. ' 4.20-4.22, 6.16-6.18 (listing violations that may trigger R2P, including
violations of Geneva Conventions, which encompass the LOAC legal corpus, as well as
human rights norms, and examining legal capacity for R2P).
112. Id. 1 2.14-2.15 (advocating for a recharacterization of sovereignty from
sovereignty as contro" to "sovereignty as resl)onsibili").
113. Compare id. JJ 4.16, with Langan, supra note 45, at 25-37 (explaining the just war
criteria).
114. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I. 4.16 (listing the six criteria for
intervention).
115. See id. 4.18-4.23 (explaining the criteria for justified humanitarian military
intex ention).
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According to ICISS, violence in a state only rises to an actionable
level when it "shock[s] the conscience of mankind" or "present[s]
such a clear and present danger to international security, that they
require coercive military intervention ,"116
A monitored state may have 'Just cause" to act unilaterally under
R2P if the humanitarian crisis in a monitored state reaches a certain
threshold level of severity and the UJNSC has not or is not expected to
intervene.1 17 The "systematic and widespread" criterion is part of the
standard used to determine the existence of an atrocity crime; the
existence of one of these four egregious crimes is the foundation for
the justification of humanitarian intervention or interference.'8
NATO applied R2P principles when it intervened in Libya in
March 2011 to protect civilians in the context of an NIAC.'19 UNSC
Resolution 1973 authorized international intervention in Libya
through establishment of a "No Fly" zone and interdiction of Libyan
Armed Forces attacks on its citizens in order to protect Libyan
civilians from violence committed by their own government. 20 The
UNSC's approval of NATO military action provided a measure of
legitimacy the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in international
law. 121 Growing state acceptance of the legality of R2P principle can
116. See id. 4.13.
117. See id. '4.19 (describing the just cause requirement in terms of two broad
categories: (1) large scale loss of life, or (2) large scale "ethnic cleansing").
118. See Theodor Meron, 4ar Crimes Law Comnes of'Age, 92 Am. J. INTL L. 462 464
(1998) (explaining the origins of the widespread or systematic criterion in the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia); see also EVANS, supra note 101, at 11-13
(exploring the modem definition of mass atrocity).
119. See Jayshree Bajoria, The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (Mar. 24, 2011), http://www.cfi'.org/human-rightsldilemma-humanitarian-
inten-entionp 16524 (discussing the legal aspects ofNATO's intervention in Libya); Daniel
Serwer, The Strikes on Libya: Humanitarian Intervention, JNot Imperial Aggression,
ATLANTIC, Mar. 19, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/03/the-
strikes-on-libya-humanitarian-iitervention-not-imperial-aggression/72740/ (arguing that
NATO's air support to Libyan rebels constituted an act of humanitarian intervention); see also
Robert Marquand, How Libya "s Qaddafi Brought Humanitarian Intervention Back in V ogue,
CHRISTIAN SCI MONITOR, Mar. 28, 2011, http://wwN.csmonitor.com/World!Middle-East/
2011/0328/How-Liby a-s-Qaddafi-brought-humanitarian-intervention-back-in-vogue
(discussing the resurgence in the debate over humanitarian intervention after NATO's actions
in Libya).
120. See S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011) (authorizing NATO
member states' actions in Libya); see also Press Release, Security Council Approves 'No-Fly
Zone' over Libya, Authorizing 'All Necessarv Measures' to Protect Civilian, by Vote of 10 in
Favour with 5 Abstentions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011).
121. See Bajoria, supra note 119 (describing the importance of the events in Libya to the
evolution of the R2P doctrine); see also Jeremy Kinsman, Libya: .4 Ca(se Jo Humanitarian
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provide legal support for less intrusive actions taken for similar
purposes. 12
II. UX\ILATERAL STTE AC]70iN: STJTE SOVlEREIGNTY V ERSES
HJIA NJYARIAN RESPONSIBILITY
There is conflict between an absolutist view of traditional
territorial state sovereignty and the still-evolving position suggesting
that armed interventions are justifiable for limited humanitarian
purposes. Part II discusses how R2P can be used to justify a specific
humanitarian interference, namely operating UAVs for the purpose of
monitoring conditions in a nonconcurring state such that their use
does not rise to the level of armed intervention. Intermediary
humanitarian interference mechanisms may provide a bridge between
blind respect for state sovereignty and respect for individual rights.
Part II outlines issues central to the application of R2P criteria in
nonforceful operations and provides context for Part lII's application
of these criteria to a specific humanitarian interference mechanism,
unilateral UAV monitoring.
Section A explores the basis for determining if a state's alleged
violations have risen to a level of severity permitting unilateral
intervention. Section B presents different positions on how to
determine when a humanitarian crisis is so severe as to warrant action
without UNSC authorization. Section C then presents the goals of
monitoring and documentation of atrocity crimes, while Section D
describes suggested limitation on the extent of permissible monitoring
activity. Finally, Section E presents a need for state control over
monitoring personnel.
A. Basis for Determining Whether a State's Violations Have Risen to
a Level that Permits Unilateral Interference
For a state to take unilateral action against another state, the
acting state must provide a legal basis for its actions. 2 If it cannot
Intervention, POL'Y OPTIONS, Oct. 2011, at 81, 82 87 (arguing that the UNSC's authorization
of NATO's mission in Libya demonstrates that the issue of "liberal humanitarian intervention"
is neither "fully validated nor discredited").
122. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11, 1.38, 4.13 (advocating
attention to nonmilitary actions in addition to military actions).
123. See U.N. Charter art. 2. para. 7 (prohibiting intervention in the domestic affairs of
another state).
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provide such a basis, then its actions are illegal under international
law. 124 For a monitoring state to have a humanitarian justification for
unilateral interference, it must provide a reliable evidentiary basis to
demonstrate that the monitored state is committing atrocity crimes, or
refusing to stop atrocity crimes against its own people. 25 To protect a
governmentfs credibility on the world stage, state officials often
attempt to provide minimum levels of evidence to support potentially
unpopular decisions.126 Without such proof, a state desiring to take
unilateral action cannot overcome its first legal hurdle. 127
Some types of data, like video footage, may be more compelling
than others in demonstrating the complicity of the monitored state in
the commission of atrocity crimes. 2' At a minimum, prior proof
should include information from multiple, independently verifiable
sources; distinguishable primary and secondary sources; reliable
eyewitness testimony, at least some of which can be independently
verified; and evidence of a reoccurring pattern of testimony of abuse
indicating potential systemic violations. 12 Evidence of this type can
124. See id. art. 2, paras. 4, 7; see also Stromseth, supra note 2, at 251 (suggesting that
intervening states must provide legal justification).
125. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11, 4.18-4.31 (placing the greatest
emphasis on establishing just cause): see also Tony Blair, Former Prime Minister, U.K.,
Speech Before the Chicago Economic Club, Doctrine of the International Community (Apr.
22, 1999), available at http:,/w.pbs.org/newshour/bb/intemational /jan-june99/blair_
doctrine4-23.html (identifying five criteria for unilateral interference, including a just cause).
126. See EVANS. supra note 101, at 235 ("A further critical ingredient in the fashioning
of political will is the existence of institutional processes capable of translating knowledge,
concern, and confident belief in the utility of action into actual action."); see also James Traub,
In the Beginning, There Was Somalia, FOREIGN POL'Y, July/Aug. 2010,
http://w-.foreignpolicy.comarticles/2010/06/21/ii the beginning there was somalia
(describing the effects of America's failed Somalia mission on later humanitarian actions).
127. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11 .[ T 4.18-4.31 (discussing the R2P
just cause requirement); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7 (providing the legal foundation
for the just cause requirement).
128. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-1. Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ' 70-75 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (listing evidentiary grounds for determining the existence of an armed conflict);
see also G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 4, JJ 138 (narrowing applicability of R2P doctrine to the
four most egregious crimes in international law).
129. See Th~o Boutruche, Credible Fact-Finding and Allegations of Irterrational
Huma itarian Law Violations: Challenges in Theory and Practice, 16 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L.
I, 10 (2011) (providing guidance for the collection of verifiable information on LOAC
violations from the field): see also SAMAN HA POWER, "A PROBLEM FROM HELL": AMERICA
AND Tim AcE OF GENOCIDE 96-97 (2 0 0 7 ) (describing the failure of US officials to treat
eyewitness testimony of refugees fleeing the Khmer Rouge as credible).
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help protect a government's credibility and rally support for
potentially unpopular, but ethically necessary, decisions.
B. Determining When a Humanitarian Crisis Warrants Action
Without United Nations Security Council Authorization
Under the UN Charter, the UNSC has the authority to intrude
upon a sovereign domestic jurisdiction. 30 These UNSC intervention
powers are not limited to military intrusions, and may include
economic sanctions and other less coercive means. 31
In contrast, a state acts "unilaterally" when it intervenes in the
internal affairs of another sovereign state either independently or as a
part of a regional grouping or other coalition without the approval of
the U-N.1
3 2
For states intending to execute unilateral humanitarian
intervention, the ideal situation is to gain UNSC approval and, in so
doing, international recognition of the mission's legitimacy. 33 The
differing political interests of the five permanent members of the
UNSC may be the largest obstacles to UNSC authorization or the
most likely to delay the decision.134 One solution suggested by some
international law scholars to remedy the at times lethargic pace of
approval of the UNSC system has been for a state or coalition of
130. See U.N. Charter arts. 39-42 (granting UNSC the power to authorize military and
nonforceful interventions).
131. See id. (outlining UN SC powers, including military and nonforceful interventions);
see also RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I, 1.37 1.41 (explaining that
"intervention" can also refer to nonmilitary actions).
132. See, e.g., NATO's Role in Relation to the Conflict in Kosovo, NATO,
http:/'/w-v-vN.nato. i nt/kosovo/history.hnn (last updated July 15, 1999) (providing a brief
overview of NATO's role in the conflict in Kosovo-an example of a unilateral action
undertaken by a collation of states).
133. see JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF FORCE BY
STATES 186 (2004) (J[]n light of the dubious legality of such actions, their necessity and
proportionality must be established beyond doubt by demonstrating that every possible
alternative has been exhaustively pursued and that the forceful response was in no manner
excessive."), see also Claire Appelegrath & Andrew Block, Acting Against Atrocities: A
Strategy for Supporters of R2P, in MASS ATROCITY CRIMES: PREVENTING FUTLTRE
OUTRAGES, supra note 3, at 128, 130 32 (arguing that recent UN action on R2P shows a
continued support for R2P and room for UN legitimization of such actions).
134. See, e.g., DAVID M. MALONE, THE INTERNATIONAL STRUGGLE OVER IRAQ:
POLITICS IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL 1980 2005, at 30 36 (2006) (discussing the political
in-fighting and competing interests of UNSC members); see also Raymond Dennett, Politics
in the Security Council 3 INT'L ORG. 421. 422-25 (1949) (exploring political divisions among
UNSC members at the very beginning of the UN).
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states to undertake an intervention and "seek to legitimate their
actions retrospectively at the UN" 135 NATO used this approach
following its 1999 bombing campaign in Kosovo as exemplified in
UNSC Resolution 1244, which granted legitimacy to a NATO civil
and military presence in Kosovo and established the UN Mission in
Kosovo. 136 The resolution operated as a retroactive approval of
NATO actions in Kosovo to that point in time. 137 Given the
entrenched political division among UNSC's members, it appears the
R2P may support the position that failure to gain UNSC approval
should not forestall the possibility of an intermediary interference if it
meets certain requirements. 138
C. Goals of Unilateral Alonitoring and Documentation
Since the end of World War II, there has been a general
consensus in the international community that the documentation of
atrocities has worth, even where it fails to immediately halt these
crimes. The goals of documentation are to deter the future
commission of unacceptable acts or atrocities and to bring to justice
those who committed the acts. 139 Reliable and comprehensive
135. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and
Procedures, 2 MELB. J. INT1 L. 550, 562 66 (2001) (discussing the use of retroactive UNSC
authorizations). See generally Anne Ryniker, The ICRC's Position on "Humanitarian
Intervention," 83 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 527 (2001) (laying out the International Committee
of the Red Cross's position on humanitarian intervention).
136. See S.C. Res. 1244, supra note 11, J17 (authorizing an international security
presence in Kosovo); Press Release, NATO, Statement Issued at the Extraordinary Ministerial
Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, M-NAC-1(99)51. (Apr.
12, 1999), available at http://www.nato.int/docu prl1999/p99-051e.htm (provides outline of
NATO goals tor its Kosovo mission); see also Thomas M. Franck, nteipretation and Change
in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL,
LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMIAS, supra note 2. at 204, 225 (arguing that UN SC Resolution
1244 should be interpreted as tacit acceptance of the NATO action).
137. See Alain Pellet, State Sovereignty and the Protection of Fundamental Human
Rights: An International Law Perspective, PUGWASH ONLINE (Feb. 2000)
http:/'/w-v-vN.pugwish.orgireports/irc/pellet.htm (arguing that UNSC's recognition demonstrates
the legality of the action.); see also Henkin, supra note 103, at 827-28 (viewing Resolution
1244 as laying a solid foundation for similar actions in the future).
138. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note II, 4.18-.43 (laying out R2P
criteria, which directly parallel older Just War criteria).
139. See G.A. Res. 677, U.N. GAOR, 63d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/63/677, ' 9, (Jan. 12,
2009) (emphasizing the crucial role early warning systems (which include human rights
documentation) play in atrocity response operations): see also Nathan Hodge, ltaking Plans to
Stop .1ass Murder, WALL ST. J., May 10, 2011, at A6 (describing the Pentagon's MAPRO
program and the continued influence ofthe MAPRO Handbook).
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information can help shift policy debates from whether to intervene to
how to do so.14  Release of documentary evidence collected by one
state against another is a difficult and delicate balancing act between
respect for state sovereignty and distribution of the information to
organizations best positioned to help those most affected. 1
The recent collaboration between US Southern Command
("U SSOUTHCOM") and a number of nongovernmental organizations
("NGOs") following the January 2010 earthquake in Haiti is an
example of a military-civilian information sharing operation. 142 In
January 2010, a Global Hawk UAV was deployed over Haiti to
document the extent of the damage caused by the January 12, 2010,
earthquake.1 43 USSOUTHCOM released thousands of the images to
NGOs and other trusted organizations over the Internet, with the hope
that making the information more readily available would ease overall
reconstruction efforts.
144
140. See SEWALL ET AL., supra note 3, at 5-6 (emphasizing the debilitating effect a
failure to adequately plan can have on the US government's ability to prevent or respond to
atrocities); see also PSD-10, supra note I (outlining the goals of developing a national atrocity
response doctrine).
141. See, e.g., USAID Post-Earthquake Response, U SAID/1- AITI,
http://ww .usaid.gov/ht/helphaiti.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2012) (providing a central clearing
house of information on US relief efforts in Haiti). See generally Hezeldah Barge, Jr. et al.,
Field Level Information Collaboration During Complex Humanitarian Emergencies and Peace
Operations (Jure 2003) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Naval Postgraduate School) (on file with the
Naval Postgraduate School Library system) (analyzing practices during past civilian-military
partnerships in complex humanitarian emergencies).
142. See Russell P. Petcoft Global Hawk Collects Reconnaissance Data During Haiti
Relief Efjbrts, U.S. AIR FORCE, (Jan. 15, 2010), http:ii-w.af.mil/news/istoy.asp'id=
123185754 (describing how the US Air Force sent a UAV to fly over Haiti after the January
2010 earthquake and then released photos to trusted organizations to help distribute aid); see
also Paul McLeary, Global Hawk Flying Over Haiti, AVIATION WEEK (Jan. 15, 2010, 8:42
AM), http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController Blog&
plckBlogPage=BlogView Post&newspaperUserld=2 7ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-0 I 329aef79a7&
plckPostld Blog%3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42dO-bd3a-O 13 29aef79a7Post%3A297f878f-4b3e-4888-
9b55-9f2587cae9bf&plckScript blogScript&plclkElementld blogDest (describing the US Air
Force's mission over Haiti and the distribution of the collected photographs).
143. See McLeary, supra note 142 (explaining the method of distribution of these
photographs): see also U.S. AR-MY UAS CTR. OF EXCELLENCE, "EYES OF THE ARMY": U.S.
ARMY ROADMAP FOR UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 2012 "035, at 19 (2010) (describing
the environment in which UAVs will have to be deployed).
144. See Judith Snyderman, Global Hawk Photographs Damage to Help Relief Efjbrts,
AIR FORCE PRINT NEWS TODAY (Jan. 15, 2010), http:,//ww.acc. afmil inews/story-print.asp?
id 123185881 (explaining use of Global Hawk to photograph damage to help triage relief
efforts); see also Nathan Hodge, US Diverts Spy Drone from Afghanistan to Haiti, DANGER
ROOM: WIRED (Jan. 15, 2010, 11:35 AM), http:w//,w.wired.com/dangerroom/2010/01/
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Collaboration between interagency groups, NGOs, and the
military provided USSOUTHCOM with information as to which
targets were more critical to document given the overwhelming
destruction in the country following the earthquake and the need to
triage humanitarian resources. 145 To access the images
USSOUTHCOM put on the Internet, individuals or groups had to be
members of the All Partner Access Network ("APAN"). 146
USSOUTHCOM's release of the Global Hawk's Haiti images via
APAN is an example of a successful military-civilian collaboration. 47
Effective documentation and monitoring programs can also
assist prosecutors in bringing domestic or international cases against
the perpetrators of atrocities. 48 Cases in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia have affirmed that the principle
of individual criminal responsibility is applicable to breaches of
LOAC in both the IAC and NIAC contexts. 149 In NIACs, individual
pentagon-shares-earthquake-images-from-high-flying-spy-drone/ (showing photos from the
Global Hawk's flight over Haiti in 2010).
145. See McLeary, supra note 142 (describing the military-civilian coordination
involved in the Global Hawk's flight)- see also VT GROUP, CASE STUDY: DEVASTATING
EARTHQUAKE PN- HAITI' PIONEERING TECHNOLOGY APPLICATION SAVES TiMer & RESOLRCES
(2010), available at wvw vt-group.com/mediai 1406ihaitieaithquakecasestudy.pdf
(describing the use of a private contractor to send a UAV to check on an orphanage in Haiti
after the 2010 earthquake).
146. See Disaster Response: APAN Aids in Haiti Relief Efforts, APAN,
https://comnunit).apan.org/p/featured haiti.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2012) (describing
APAN's role in the postearthquake relief effort).
147. See Volker Franke, he Peacebuilding Dilemma: Civil-Military Cooperation in
Stability Operations, 11 INTL J. PEACE STUD. 5. 6 9 (2006) (examining issues of military-
civilian cooperation during humanitarian operations); see also Andrew Harris & Peter
Dombrowski, Militarv Collaboration with Humanitarian Organizations in Complex
Emergencies, 8 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 155, 157 59 (2002) (discussing the challenges to
successful militar -civilian partnerships).
148. See Neil J. Kritz, Coming to Terms with Atrocities: A Review of Accountability
Mechanisms for llass V iolations of Human Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4,
Autumn 1996, at 127, 130-45 (1996) (discussing accountability mechanisms after the
commission of atrocities); see also U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMMWR FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
HRiPiPTi7, TRAINING MANUAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORING -33 34 (2001)
(explaining the appropriate role of human rights monitors vis-a-vis domestic judicial systems).
149. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. 1T-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, JI 96-127 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Oct. 2, 1995) (extending the substantive law applicable to NIAC); id jj 128-34 (describing
individual criminal responsibility in an NIAC); see also Thomas Graditzky, Individual
Criminal Responsibility for V iolations of Iternational Humanitarian Law Committed in Non-
international Armed Conflicts, 332 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 29, 37-40 (1998) (explaining the
limitations of individual criminal responsibility in NIACs).
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criminal responsibility accrues to both state and nonstate actors. 150 An
analogous role may be foreseen in possible criminal prosecutions
based on the information collected through unilateral UAV
monitoring, 11
D. Appropriate Limitations on the Extent of MAlonitoring and the T)pe
of Data Collected
Two precautions can be taken with regard to the collection of
data via monitoring. First, the data collected can be limited to that
concerning the commission of atrocities in violation of LOAC. 152
Unilateral monitoring of the storage locations of weapons not alleged
to have been used to commit atrocities is still prohibited. 5 Second,
the data collected cannot be used to undermine the sovereignty of the
monitored state except to the extent necessary for effective
monitoring. 154 The goal of all humanitarian action governed by
LOAC is to ease the transition from armed conflict back to peace. 155
150. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E),
Decision on Preliminary Motion based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitnent), 22 (May
31, 2004) (finding that nonstate parties are bound by LOAC).
151. See Wendy S. Betts et aL, The Post-Conflict !aitional Administration of Kosovo
and the Lessons-Learned in Efbrts to Establish a Judicia1y and Rule of Lau, 22 MICH. J.
INTl L. 371, 375 78 (2001) (outlining the hurdles and reforms undertaken by the transitional
administration in Kosovo after the war). See generally Rachel Brett, Human Rights and the
OSCE, 18 Hum. RTS. Q. 668 (1996) (documenting the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe's evolving treatment of human rights issues).
152. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11, 4.39 (detailing the
"proportional means" criterion); see also Jean Bethke Elshtain, Just JVTIr and Humanitarian
Intervention, 17 AM. U. INTL L. REV. 1, 9 15 (2002) (examining humanitarian intervention
from a just war perspective and addressing the "just cause" criterion).
153. See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N.
Doc. A/5217, at 123 (Oct. 20, 1970) (expanding the concept of noninterference in a
nonbinding resolution by stating that|n]o State or group of States has the right to intervene,
directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other
State"); Q & A: US Targeted Killings and International Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Dec. 19,
2011), http://www.-hrw.org/news/2011 12/19/q-us-targeted-killings-and-interationa-law
(arguing that attack on sites similar to these would be a violation of international law).
154. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I 1, 4.39-4.40 (explaining that the
second criterion is based on the underlying principle of proportionality of response).
155. See Mark Freeman & Dra2an Djukic, Jus Post Belim and Transitonal Justice, in
Jus POST BELLUTI: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION FROM CONFLICT TO PEACE 213, 213-30
(Carsten Stahn & Jann K. Kleffner eds., 2008) (advocating for the development ofjus post
belium). See generally VERONIQUE DUDOUET, BERGHOF RESEARCH CTR. FOR CONSTRUCTIVE
CONFLICT MGMT., BERGHOF REPORT NR. 16, SURVIVING THE PEACE: CHALLENGES OF WAR-
TO-PEACE TRA1NSITIONS FOR CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS (2007) (discussing the
challenges of returning to peace).
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Due regard, therefore, can be paid to the potential deleterious effects
an overly broad release of data may have on the monitored state's
ability to rebuild after hostilities. 5 Limiting the scope of the data
collected to only that necessary to achieve the goals of the monitoring
mission may fulfill R2P's proportionality criterion and protect the
sovereignty of the affected state. 157 Together, these limitations
provide the monitoring state further support for its claims to
humanitarian legitimacy.15
E. State Control of Monitoring Personnel
Both military and civilian forces utilize UAVs to carry out tasks
ranging from army reconnaissance to crop fertilization. 159 Under
current US government policy, even when UAVs are used for official
government purposes, the personnel piloting them still may be
civilian. 160 Under international law, however, the actions of both
civilian and military personnel under the "command" or "control" of a
state can sometimes be attributed to that state's military or civilian
leadership.61 In this manner, international law encourages a state to
156. See MARK DUFFIELD, IDS BULLETIN 25.4, COMPLEx EMERGENCIES AND THE
CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENTALISM §§ 6.5, 7 (1994) (critiquing how aid is integrated with the
dynamics of violence). See gene l/v Michael Pugh, Challenges of Post-Co/itct Intercession:
Three ssues inInternational Politics, in JUS POST BELLUM: TOWARDS A LAW OF TRANSITION
FROM CONTLICT TO PEACE, supra note 156, at 115 (exploring a liberal interpretation of
postconflict reconstruction).
157. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note I 1, 4.39 ("The means have to be
commensurate with the ends, and in line with the magnitude of the original provocation."); see
also Garv Chapman, National Security and the Internet (July 1998) (urpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.utexas.eduilbj/2 lcp/isoc.htm (exploring what data lies within a state's
national security interests).
158. See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, supra note 11, 4.39 (explaining R2P's just
cause criterion).
159. See Factsheet: Unmanned Aircraft Systems, FED. AVIATION AGENCY (July 15,
2010), http://ww.faa.go-/news/fiact-sheets/news-story.cfm?newsld=6287 (explaining the
developing nonmilitary uses of UAVs in the United States); see also Owen Bowcott & Paul
Lewis, Attack of the Drones, GUARDIAN (U.K.). Jan. 16, 2011, at 10 (examining increase in
the use ofUAVs outside ofthe military context)
160. See Jeff Wise, Civilian UA!s: Vo Pilot, Vo Problem, POPULAR MECHANICS (Oct.
1, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.populaimechanics.coliscience/space/4213464 (looking at the
growing use of UAVs by civilian agencies and nongovernmental groups); see also Malia
Wollan, In this Sky, the Planes Fly Alone, N.Y. TIMEWS. May 15, 2011, at BI (examining the
rise of civilian use of UAVs in the United States and the growing nongovernmental UAV
sector).
161. See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art.
1, Oct. 18, 1907. 36 Star. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 (codifying the basic principle of
command responsibility); see also In Re Yamashita, 327 U.S. , 13 18 (1946) (exploring the
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exercise responsible control over operations carried out in its name.
162
States protect themselves from perceptions of lack of responsible
control by establishing clear chains of command, educating personnel
on LOAC principles, and maintaining control over personnel involved
in state-supported missions. 16 3
III. DETERMVIANG THE PERMISSIBILITY OF HUMV4NIL4RIAN
IVTERFERENCE OPERA TIOAS: CRITERL FOR PER MIISSIBLE
UVN ILATERAL UA V MIONITORIG
UN member states should be encouraged to take action to deter
atrocities as they take place. One way to do so is to provide
permissible intermediary humanitarian interference mechanisms that
meet R2P-based criteria.1 64 On the humanitarian response continuum,
permissible interference operations lie between complete inaction and
forceful intervention. This position is valuable for the flexibility it
affords decisionmakers, enabling quick escalation or cessation of state
involvement. The unilateral use of UAVs to monitor mass atrocities
perpetrated within the borders of a nonconsenting state is an example
of only one such option. Suggested criteria for determining the
permissibility of specific UAV monitoring missions could be used by
extension to evaluate the permissibility of similar mechanisms.
Part III is divided into three sections. Section A argues that
humanitarian interference operations fit into the trajectory of state
acceptance of R2P and general humanitarian actions. Second, Section
issue of command responsibility in the American legal context); Greg R. Vetter, Comnidan
Responsibility of \on-Military Superiors in the International Crimmal Court (ICC,. 25 YALE
L INT'L L. 89. 92-93 (2000) (exploring the manner in which the Rome Statute holds civilian as
well as militany leaders accountable under command responsibility).
162. See generally DAVID S. ALBERTS & RICHARD E. HAYES, DEP'T OF DEF.,
COMMAN D & CONTROL RESEARCH PROGRAM, UNDERSTANDING COMMAND AND CONTROL
(2006) (providing a thorough explanation of command and control theory inside the US
military, including the distinction between control and command); see also Ross Pigeau &
Carol McCann, Re-Conceptualizing Command and Control, CANADIAN MIL. J., Spring 2002,
at 54, 54 55 (exploring the various ideas behind the military sense of"command" and arguing
that command is distinct and more complex than control).
163. See DEP'T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE No. 2311.01E, DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM § 4
(2006) (stating that DoD policy is to apply the LOAC in all conflicts by all components of the
Department of Defense, even those run by contractors) see also INT'L & OPERATIONAL LAW
DEP'T, U.S. ARMY JUDGE ADVOCATE GEN.'S LEGAL CTR. & SCH., OPERATIONAL LAW
HANDBOOK 49 67 (2008) (providing nuanced instruction for the applicability of LOAC
principles in different conflicts).
164. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (discussing the "systematic and
widespread" aspect of the standard for threshold level of severity).
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B applies the criteria used to justify R2P interventions to
humanitarian interference operations. These include (i) right authority
and last resort, (ii) just cause and right intention. (iii) reasonable
prospects, and (iv) proportional means. Third, Section C proposes
restrictions on who may carry out unilateral UAV monitoring by
analyzing (i) the illegality of a nonstate actor carrying out a
humanitarian interference mission, and (ii) a requirement that a
monitoring state only entrust personnel under its direct control with
the monitoring mission.
A. Analogizing Humanitarian Interference and Humanitarian
Intervention Operations
Analogizing R2P military intervention to humanitarian
interference options accomplishes two important things. First, it uses
a set of criteria to judge the permissibility of unilateral UAV
monitoring for humanitarian purposes that are already familiar to the
international legal community because of the broad discussions
surrounding the development of R2P. 6  Additionally, the R2P criteria
are based on the jus ad bellum Just War criteria, which respect the
idea of inherent state sovereignty and similar historical principles of
international law. 1 6 After the publication of the 2001 ICISS report
and the 2005 adoption of the R2P doctrine by the UN, these criteria,
which enable military intervention based on humanitarian
justifications, have found some acceptance in the international
community. 167 As this Note proposes the legality of a unilateral action
without prior UNSC authorization, it is even more important to abide
by criteria that respect the principles governing the international legal
system and that are already familiar to the international legal
community. 68
Second, use of the R2P criteria holds unilateral humanitarian
interference missions to a high level of scrutiny because these R2P
165. See supra notes 106-22 and accompanying text (describing the genesis of the R2P
project and the continuing need for atrocity response operations as well as the specific R2P
criteria).
166. See supra notes 8. 91-95 and accompanying text (showing the continued
importance of sovereignty under the UN Charter and international law).
167. See supra notes I I 102 63 and accompanying text (explaining the origins of R2P).
168. See supra notes 62-70, 91-98 and accompanying text (explaining the general
prohibition on the use of force and the tension between this and the moral need to act in the
face of atrocity crimes).
2012] 440AITORIATG ATROCITY CRIMJES ITTIDRONES 1155
criteria are intended to judge the permissibility of military
interventions. 169 Given that these criteria were designed to judge
forceful actions, they may arguably be stricter than necessary for
nonforceful humanitarian interference missions. 170 Additionally,
UNSC authorization of NATO's mission in Libya beginning in May
2011 shows a continuation of the trend of state acceptance of R2P
criteria and of humanitarian intervention-type missions in general. 71
Permissibility criteria for nonforceful humanitarian interference
operations should be based on the military intervention standards of
the R2P doctrine for two reasons. 172 First, the R2P criteria are well
known, were widely debated in the international community, and are
derived from the Just War tradition. 173 Second, using the heightened
level of scrutiny applied to a use of force helps the monitoring state
meet higher justification standards of unilateral actions taken outside
of UNSC authorization. 174 The following section explores the use of
R2P intervention criteria in the context of nonforceful humanitarian
interference operations.
B. Criteria for Permissible t nilateral U14 V Alonitoring QfAtrocities
It is critical to balance the need for a heightened justification
standard for unilateral actions with the dire need for the development
of permissible intermediary humanitarian actions, including the
collection of reliable information in the midst of the commission of
atrocity crimes. 175 To do this, this Note proposes the use of the R2P
standard of judging military intervention for an analogous purpose in
determining the permissibility of nonforceful humanitarian
169. See supra notes II- 16 and accompanying text (discussing the R2P criteria by
vIich military intervention is justified for humanitarian purposes).
170. See supra notes 2. 11 and accompanying text (discussing nonforceful humanitarian
intervention actions).
171. See supra notes 119-22 and accompanying text (explaining the resurgence of the
humanitarian intervention debate following NATO's actions in Libya in 2011).
172. See supra notes 113 18 and accompanying text (listing threshold criteria to
determine the permissibility of forceful humanitarian interventions).
173. See supra notes 44-50, 113-14 and accompanying text (explaining the origins of
R2P and its adoption of criteria analogous tojus ad be/lur just war criteria).
174. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (explaining that military
intervention is permissible under R2P only in extreme cases and discussing the skewed degree
ofattention given to military intervention versus other nonorceful actions).
175. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text (discussing the UN's encouragement of
the development of nonforceful atrocity response actions, with an emphasis on
documentation).
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interference operations. The remainder of this Section discusses the
R2P intervention criteria specifically in relation to the unilateral use
of unarmed UAVs to monitor a state's commission of atrocity crimes
within its domestic borders.
1. Right Authority & Last Resort
Permitting unilateral UAV monitoring is part of a wider trend in
international law towards greater state acceptance of unilateral action
based on humanitarian justification.' 76 Beginning with the UNSC's
retroactive authorization of NATO's intervention in Kosovo in 1999
and moving through the IJNSC's authorization of NATO's actions in
Libya in 2011, UN action shows a general progression of increasing
involvement in, or authorization of, humanitarian missions. " The
trend of increasing UN humanitarian action, with parallel and greater
encouragement of nonmilitary humanitarian actions, demonstrates
that unilateral monitoring is a legitimate intermediary step between
complete inaction and military intervention. 171
Defining a permissibility standard for humanitarian interference
is the next logical step towards effective implementation of R2P.179
Unilateral UAV monitoring, unlike a military intervention, does not
rise to the level of force under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.'"0
Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of force by states, however,
"force" under Article 2(4) is widely understood to be limited to armed
force."' Because UAV monitoring does not involve the use of force,
the standard applied to this method of unilateral interference should
be less than that applied to forceful humanitarian intervention. 18 2
176. See supra notes 2, 65, 106 and accompanying text (discussing greater acceptance of
humanitarian intervention actions following NATO's actions in Kosovo).
177. See supra notes 2, 65, 106, 122 24 and accompanying text (discussing the effects
of NATO's actions in Kosovo and Libya on the acceptance of humanitarian intervention and
R2P).
178. See supra notes 32 37 and accompanying text (discussing the ongoing tension
between increasing acceptance of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention or interference
actions and the general prohibition on the use or threat of force).
179. See supra notes 3, 11 and accompanying text (explaining and supporting
nonforceful actions to stop or prevent atrocities).
180. See supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text (discussing nonintervention and the
general prohibition on the use of force).
181. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning of"force").
182. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text (explaining the various degrees of
"force" in the international context).
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2. Just Cause and Right Intention
For unilateral UAV monitoring to be permissible, monitoring
states must have a reasonable basis for believing that the monitored
state is committing, or is complicit in the commission of, atrocities."8 3
This is the just cause element, whereas sending UAVs to monitor
solely based on suspicions of atrocity crimes fulfills the second
criterion of right intention.1"4 The justification standard used to judge
these criteria should be similar to that used under the R2P doctrine,
which requires evidence of violence, that "shock[s] the conscience of
mankind" or which presents a "clear and present danger to
international security." 185 The decision to implement a unilateral
monitoring mission should be based on a similar, but slightly less
strict standard. 86 A flexible standard protects a monitoring state from
allegations of illegal actions while simultaneously protecting the
monitored state's sovereignty.
Unilateral UAV monitoring is not justified, however, when it is
undertaken solely with the intent to collect evidence for future cases
against perpetrators."87 While supporting a potential future criminal
prosecution may be a complementary function to UAV monitoring, it
should not serve as the primary justification. If monitoring states are
too closely tied with prosecutions. it may open the door to charges of
selective infornation-gathering, or selective justice in the eyes of the
global public.1"'
3. Reasonable Prospects
In order to justify a unilateral monitoring mission, an acting state
should have a reasonable expectation that the operation will result in
183. See supra notes 11, 49, 113 14 and accompanying text (listing just cause as a just
war" and R2P criterion).
184. See supra notes 49, 114 and accompanying text (listing right intention as a just war
and R2P criterion).
185. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text (discussing the R2P standards).
186. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (explaining that economic and other
nonforceful methods of intervention are exceptions to the general prohibition on the use of
"force").
187. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text (describing when the UNSC may
intervene within a state (not including for the purposes of prosecutions) and exploring
analogous situations in which a state may act unilaterally).
188. See supra notes 152-59 and acconpanying text (discussing the dangers of
monitoring).
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relevant data collection.189 UAV monitoring is not a solution in and of
itself. Unilateral UAV monitoring is most appropriate where the
geographical and other elements of the conflict lend themselves to
both UAV surveillance and the likelihood of collection of clear
evidence.90 Simply collecting data does not save human lives, but the
effective use of reliable evidence within a larger arsenal of atrocity
response operations may provide invaluable support for actions that
do directly save lives.1 9'
There are three likety results to a unilateral UAV monitoring
mission. First, the evidence collected might show the monitored state
to be committing, or complicit in the commission of, atrocities. If this
were to occur, the monitoring state has recourse to already established
methods of actions under R2P and developing UN and state practice
regarding humanitarian crises. 192 Second, evidence might be
uncovered that the monitored state is not committing or permitting the
commission of atrocities. In this situation, the monitoring state should
immediately cease all monitoring operations as its justifications for
doing so disappear as soon as the evidence shows that the monitored
state is not guilty of the believed crimes. 193 Third, the monitoring state
may be unable to come to a firm conclusion as to whether or not the
monitored state is committing or complicit in the commission of
atrocities. If, after a reasonable period of monitoring, a state cannot
come to a firm determination as to the monitored state's guilt or
complicity, it will likely lose any legal justification for continued
unilateral action. 194
189. See supra notes 11- 16 and accompanying text (listing reasonable prospects as a
just war and R2P criterion and explaining these categories in light of customary law).
190. See supra notes 12-23 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits and
limitations of UAV technology).
191. See supra notes 12-15, 20-28 and accompanying text (discussing the technological
benefits of UAVs in a number of environments and their possible use in atrocity response
operations).
192 See supra notes 2, 104. 119-22 and accompanying text (providing examples of the
growing acceptance).
193. See supra notes 113 18 and accompanying text (listing just cause as a just war and
RIP criterion and the requirements of the just cause criterion).
194. See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text (discussing the criteria ofjust cause
and reasonable prospects).
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4. Proportional Means
If each of the other criteria is met, a monitoring state must still
use proportional means in its conduct of the monitoring mission.
195
Thus the monitoring state would have to the balance the action
employed and the underlying goal justifying the mission. 196 For
example, if State X were to suspect State Y of large-scale ethnic
cleansing, the presence of State Ys death squads may provide State X
justification for sending UAVs to unilaterally monitor an area
suspected to be a locus of atrocities. State X may, however, lack
similar justification for using the same UAV to simultaneously collect
intelligence on State Fs unrelated weapons systems. This Section
examines the potential effects of a proportional means criterion
through two related points: first, it explores possible restrictions the
criterion may place on the subsequent use of compiled information;
second, it proposes that adherence to this criterion may support the
potential deterrence effect of UAV monitoring.
C. Restrictions on the Release of Compiled Data
Release of data collected through a unilateral monitoring mission
poses serious questions regarding infringements on the monitored
state's sovereignty. 97 Releasing collected information to the public at
large might have collateral consequences unrelated to the commission
of atrocities. Instead, if a monitoring state decides to distribute
compiled data to the public, it should do so via credible and reliable
means to protect a monitored state's legitimate national interests. 98
The information collected from UAV monitoring missions might
be distributed to trusted international organizations (e.g., the Red
Cross), NGOS, or news outlets. 199 Following the January 2010
earthquake in Haiti, USSOUTHCOM created a military-civilian
195. See supra notes 49. 114 and accompanying text (listing proportional means as a just
war and R2P criterion).
196. See supra notes 49, 114 and accompanying text (explaining the intricacies of
proportionality and the use of force).
197. See supra notes 8 10, 32 34 and accompanying text (discussing the continued
relevance of sovereignty and the rights of nations).
198. See supra notes 142-47 and accompanying text (describing the US government's
use of the Global Hawk UAV over Haiti following the 2010 earthquake and the protections
used in the release of the collected data).
199. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (describing the release of data
follow ing the 2010 Haitian earthquake).
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information-sharing system that could serve as an example of an
appropriate collaboration. 200 This type of system, in which
information is released to known, responsible parties, and not directly
to the public at large, would provide a laver of due diligence and fact-
checking between the monitoring state and the global public.
Together, these various humanitarian players may provide the global
public a more nuanced and neutral understanding of a state-
perpetrated atrocity as it develops.
1. Deterrence
The benefits of unilateral UAV monitoring derive mainly from
the reliable evidentiary basis it can provide to states for further
action. 1 In this way unilateral monitoring can provide potentially
dispositive evidence as to a states participation or innocence in
alleged atrocity crimes. UAV technology may have a direct effect on
the ability of prosecutors to build a future case against the
perpetrators by enabling the collection of relevant data and
evidence. 2° In these ways, UAV monitoring might also act as a
deterrent if perpetrators begin to fear the public release of information
concerning, or evidence of, their crimes.
Informing the monitored states of the mission may increase any
potential deterrent effect of unilateral monitoring.20 3 Once UAVs are
in the air, there is no reason not to inform a monitored nation that
UAVs are in the sky recording its actions. Informing the monitored
state of the UAV mission serves two functions. First, it puts the
monitored state on guard. hopefully encouraging it to stop committing
atrocities or to protect its citizens from such acts. Second, it might
promote the credibility of the monitoring state.
Taken together, the criteria listed in Part II.B above provide a
basis for determining whether or not a unilateral monitoring mission
200. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text (explaining past American civilian-
military partnerships).
201. See supra notes 12 23 and accompanying text (explaining the technological
developments in UAV technology).
202. See supra notes 8, 11, 49, 113-14 and accompanying text (explaining that without
justification, states cannot overcome the presumption of illegality).
203. See supra note 12-15, 20-28, 131 and accompanying text (discussing the benefits
of UAV surveillance technology and effective guidelines for the collection and dissemination
of eyewimesses testimony and its value as an early warning tool).
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is justified on humanitarian grounds. °4 Use of the heightened military
intervention criteria put forth by R2P helps to address the higher
justification threshold that attaches to actions not authorized by the
UNSC. 2' 5 Based on these criteria, unilateral UAV monitoring is a
permissible humanitarian interference and an intermediary action
available to states wishing to act to halt or deter the commission of
atrocity crimes.2 6 Building off the base laid by Part II.A and II.B, the
following section explores the question of who may use UAVs to
unilaterally monitor mass atrocities.
2. Restrictions on Who May Carry Out Unilateral UAV Monitoring as
Part of a Permissible Humanitarian Interference Mission
Our modern system of international governance is still based on
statehood and the rights and responsibilities of states vis- -vis other
sovereign states.2"7 This Note argues that humanitarian interference
operations are only permissible if carried out by a state against
another state, and even then only if the monitoring state maintains
direct control over the monitoring personnel. This Section examines
the question of who may legally carry out a unilateral UAV
monitoring mission from two angles. First, it inquires into the level of
control a monitoring state should maintain over the personnel it tasks
with collecting the information. Second, it suggests that the same
arguments that support the permissibility of unilateral humanitarian
interference missions carried out by states forbid the execution of
these missions to nonstate actors.
3. Prohibition on Unilateral Monitoring by Nonstate Parties
UAV monitoring and other humanitarian interference options
should not be considered legitimate if carried out by a nonstate
party. 208 Nonstate actors, like Human Rights Watch, should be
204. See supra notes 11, 101-22 and accompanying text (outlining the general principles
of the R2P project).
205. See supra notes 8. 11, 102-15, 130-38 and accompanying text (explaining UNSC
intervention powers and R2P criteria for determining permissibility of humanitarian
interventions).
206. See supra notes 8, 25-37, 130-38 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of sovereignty to the international system).
207. See supra notes 8-9, 3942, 68 70 and accompanying text (discussing the modem,
state-centered international system).
208. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text (discussing the subjects of
international law and excluding nonstate actors).
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prohibited from engaging in the type of unilateral UAV monitoring
advocated in this Note.2 °9 Some, like NGOs, remain under the legal
jurisdiction of the state in which they take an action. This could create
a perverse financial incentive on the part of UAV service providers to
lobby NGOs for monitoring at the expense of an NGO more carefully
weighing the consequences of a decision to monitor. 210 To protect the
principle of sovereign equality between states within the international
system, it is thus necessary to prohibit nonstate actors from carrying
out unilateral UAV monitoring missions.
C. Requirement that Mkonitoring State Mklaintain Direct Control over
Monitoring Personnel
A monitoring state should exert positive control of its
monitoring mission through direct command of the pilots of UAVs or
direct control of the process that programs autonomously operating
UAVs used in unilateral monitoring. 2 1 By limiting itself to UAV
pilots or operators under its direct command, a monitoring state
ensures that those operating UAVs have been briefed on the
applicable LOAC.212 Additionally, the monitoring state ensures that it
can effectively control the scope of the surveillance undertaken, the
nature of the information collected, and implement necessary
restrictions on the distribution of the information. 2' A monitoring
state should maintain direct control over the personnel it employs to
carry out a unilateral monitoring mission in order to preserve the
humanitarian justifications supporting the action.
This Section applied traditional jus ad bellum criteria to analyze
the legality of unilaterally monitoring atrocity crimes in an NIAC
with unarmed UAVs. In doing so, it demonstrated use of these criteria
to evaluate permissibility of a single humanitarian inference
mechanism, but also highlighted necessary restrictions like the
prohibition of such actions by nonstate actors. This analysis is
209. See supra notes 8, 3942, 68 70 and accompanying text (describing principles
applicable in state-to-state relations).
210. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (discussing humanitarian
interv ention from ajuspost belum perspective).
211. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying (discussing command responsibility and
its potential effect on humanitarian interference operations).
212. See supra notes 159 63, 172 and accompanying text (explaining DoDfs LOAC
policies).
213. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying (discussing counand responsibility, an
important issue in data distribution).
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intended to encourage states to add use of unarmed UAVs to their
humanitarian interference "toolkit."
CONCLUSION
States must be encouraged and empowered to act to deter
systematic and widespread violence against civilians. To accomplish
this, practical intermediary humanitarian interference mechanisms
must be developed that do not resort to the use of force. The
development of these mechanisms should include a debate on the
appropriate criteria by which to determine their permissibility when
undertaken unilaterally and without UNSC authorization.
The use of UAVs to unilaterally monitor a state committing, or
complicit in the commission of, atrocity crimes against its civilian
population in the course of an NIAC is an acceptable and legally
defensible action. The legitimacy of unilateral UAV missions rests on
the ability of the monitoring state to prove that it has met requisite
R2P humanitarian justification criteria. The technology and legal
basis exist for the unilateral use of UAVs to monitor atrocities in
NIACs. What is missing is state acceptance of the legitimacy of this
intermediary option. It is time, therefore, to develop a range of
effective and accepted criteria to determine the legitimacy of
nonforceful humanitarian interference operations. The unilateral use
of UAVs to monitor state commission of atrocities should be one of
many options available in a developing arsenal of intermediary
humanitarian atrocity prevention and response operations.
NOTES AND OBSERVATIONS
